

2/3 · 1974

COOPERATION AND CONFLICT

NORDIC JOURNAL
OF
INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS

Small States in International Politics: A Polar-Political Perspective

GUNNAR SKAGESTAD

The study of small states may be perceived, alternatively, as a distinctly separate discipline within the broader subject area of international politics, or, as one particular approach to the study of international politics in general. So may the study of the 'new territories'. In this chapter, the two perspectives combine.

Presenting the 'new territories studies' as a novel approach to the traditional small states studies, the chapter discusses the practical/political possibilities and limitations inherent in the small states' situation and is also an attempt to contribute toward an improved theoretical basis for the study of small-state behavior. The empirical material is mainly the developments in inter-state relations which have taken place in the Antarctic (the 'Antarctic Model'); the Arctic situation is also presented for comparative purposes.

The author arrives at certain guarded generalizations, where the need for international cooperation emerges as a major contingent factor regarding the validity of descriptive and normative hypothesizing on small state behavior.

I. A PROJECT-ORIENTED POINT OF DEPARTURE

Although the study of small states attracts the attention of scholars to an increasing degree, and also the fact that a not inconsiderable literature is now available in this field,¹ it none the less still appears to some extent and in several respects as 'virgin territory'. The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs addressed itself to this theme at a Nordic conference in January 1971² — an occasion which served to uncover some of those basic theoretical weaknesses to which the research in some way has been liable. Among these weaknesses, it should be emphasized, in particular, that there has been considerable uncertainty as to what kind of criteria — e.g. resource-oriented *v.* behavioral — should be made the basis for a fruitful definition of the concept of 'small state' (and of its opposite, the concept 'big state'). More generally, there seems to be a certain need to assume new perspectives in the study of small states.

The object of the present paper is to contribute towards meeting this need, and to exhibit certain aspects of the research which is being carried out under the

'new territories project' of the Fridtjof Nansen Foundation, and of some of the result material which is available.³ This project has been concerned with certain problem-situations which are also of significance in the study of small states in international politics. Its aim is, *inter alia*, to explore international interaction in regions where extraordinary conditions are present (the so-called 'new territories'; cf. below), where one is dealing with limited numbers of actors, and where, in particular, problems of cooperation occupy a central place. These inquiries are relevant because some of the actors concerned are small states.

This point of departure will involve a particular interest in the concept 'new territories'⁴ — a common term applied to several types of region the geographic characteristics of which, together with certain dynamic factors, make their study fruitful from a common angle. Such 'new territories' have certain common features which distinguish them from existing and recognized national territories. A 'new territory' is defined as:⁵

a geographical area which (a) has not previously been subject to the inter-

nationally recognized sovereignty of any state or placed under the authority of any international organization, and (b) becomes the object of activities which create a need for regulation and control of what occurs in the area.

To the 'new territories' belong, respectively, *space* and *extra-terrestrial bodies*, the *open seas*, the *seabed*, and the *polar regions*. (In the widest sense, one might include here certain non-geographically delimited, professional regions of interest.) In these regions it is found that there are, in particular, two partly intersecting considerations which characterize the conduct of the actors, and thereby also the political-dynamic situation of the regions:⁶

- (1) The practical exploitative means of the actors — their *capability*;
- (2) the actors' need for a minimum degree of law and order — i.e. the need for *political regulation*.

The central unsolved problem with regard to the 'new territories' is concerned, then, with the actual and future *regulation*. This raises a question of vital importance for the individual agents involved as well as in a global context: Should political regulation be brought about through *conflict* or through *cooperation*?

Here it must be pointed out that the concrete problems in the various 'new territories' (e.g. in the Arctic and in the Antarctic, respectively) are not identical, but that the types of problem may be said to be 'interchangeable' in the sense that they can be incorporated into a common analytical perspective.

From this background one can discern the outlines of a general 'small state/big state balance model', which can be applied to the various types of problem present in the northern and southern polar regions, respectively.

As regards the use of the 'new territories project' as a point of departure for the study of small states in international politics, one may further notice the following two factors in particular:

(1) The project is not primarily a study of small states.

(2) The project has a practical political orientation and so is not anchored to any particular theory. This does not in any way preclude, however, that research carried out under the project will provide a basis for new theory formation.

II. THE 'ANTARCTIC MODEL' — SOME PROBLEM-SITUATIONS

In natural-scientific quarters the Antarctic is regarded as a veritable research laboratory, but it is also an area with a certain laboratory significance for international politics: A given number of states of different orders of magnitude have, from different motives and premises, involved themselves politically in the region. The degree and kind of their involvement vary. In certain respects the region is regulated by an international agreement — the *Antarctic Treaty* — concluded in 1959 between all the states concerned.

I shall give here a brief account of the inter-state interactions that are taking place within the framework of the Antarctic Treaty.⁷

The treaty (which took effect in 1961) has the following main points:

- (1) Demilitarization and atomic-test ban, with right of unilateral inspection on the part of the various treaty parties;
- (2) 'freezing' of the positions of the respective treaty parties with regard to territorial claims;
- (3) freedom of research and an extensive measure of international scientific cooperation;
- (4) regular consultations between the treaty parties, and, as a result, an ever stronger construction of a framework of guidelines and rules for national and international activity in the Antarctic.

Among the 12 member states of the Antarctic Treaty one finds the two super-powers — the USA and the USSR — the medium-sized powers — Great Britain,

Japan, and France — along with 7 more or less typical small states — Norway, Belgium, Argentina, Chile, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand. Furthermore, one could divide these 12 states into two main categories: (1) those states which maintain territorial claims in the Antarctic, and (2) those states which do not maintain such claims, and which do not recognize the claims of the former group. To the first group belong Great Britain, France, Norway, Argentina, Chile, Australia, and New Zealand; to the second, the USA, the USSR, Japan, Belgium, and South Africa.

International relations with regard to the Antarctic accordingly form a pattern which looks roughly like this:

On the one side there is a group comprised primarily of *smaller states* whose national interests find expression in their respective territorial claims (which, in a couple of instances, are also mutually conflicting).

On the other side there is a group comprising, *inter alia*, the two *super-powers*, whose interests in the Antarctic (which are of a relatively recent date compared to those of the claimants) find expression in the non-recognition of the territorial claims of the small states, and seem to be best served through internationalization of the region.

The function of the Antarctic Treaty has been to seek *détente* and conflict-solving by creating a *modus vivendi* and a *modus operandi* between claimants and non-claimants, between small and big states. As a consequence of the Antarctic Treaty the interactions between these states in the good decade that has passed, have essentially taken the form of highly-developed international *cooperation*. In the long run, this must be assumed to further a development in the direction of internationalization, and hence work to the advantage of the declared positions of the big powers, and to the disadvantage of those of (most of) the small states.

The particular inter-state interaction-pattern in the Antarctic, which has been

briefly presented in the above, will in what follows be referred to as the 'Antarctic Model'. Taking the preceding as our point of departure, we can sum up the relevance of the 'Antarctic Model' to the small-states problem area like this:

(1) The problem area can be studied within a delimited field where — the established cooperation notwithstanding — the conditions seem to favor a typical relation of conflict or tension, where precisely the constellation big-small seems to be a prominent element. Especially interesting is the circumstance that one can here speak of a two-dimensional tension-relation, where a distinction must be made between (a) the tension-relation between the various *national* interests, especially between the national interests of, respectively, the big and the small states, and (b) the tension-relation between, respectively, *national* and *international* objectives and interests. The two tension-fields overlap, however, in so far as the two super-powers have an international field of interest, while the small states have nationalist objectives primarily. The circumstance is further accentuated by the fact that the two big states have the capability to operate over the whole of the Antarctic, while the small states can only operate in limited regions. The circumstance that there is such a dual field of tensions lends to the study an extra dimension which has been lacking from traditional small-states studies.

(2) The model has a wider, more general interest, in so far as it is not tied to the particular, geographically delimited region of the Antarctic, but can be applied to analogous regions where the relation between states of different sizes is of significance. I have in mind here the 'new territories' problem-complex which was sketched at the outset. The analogy Antarctic/Arctic, in particular, comes to mind in that the case of the Arctic may also be regarded as a typical big-small constellation (on the one side, the super-powers of the USA and the USSR, and on the other side, the medium-sized power of Canada

and the small states of Norway and Denmark).

The 'Antarctic Model' seems to offer a fairly clear opposition between small and big states, and an internal community of interests within each of the two groups. Here, therefore, one would possibly have expected to find a pattern of interaction characterized by bloc-behavior on the part of the small states, as a means of asserting their respective national small-states interests against big-power intervention and dominion. Nothing of the sort is the case, however; cooperation in the Antarctic functions on the whole harmoniously, and those divergencies which have been brought to bear have not been in the shape of any bloc-behavior on the part of the small states. The actual interactions have, in fact, scarcely been characterized by any opposition between small and big.

Why is this so?

A key factor here is the *policy of the USA*. The American strategy obviously consists in striving toward some form of internationalization, if not *de jure*, at least *de facto*. In the event, this would give the USA, as the leading power with regard to *resources* and *capability*, the best option of being able to lead the development, with a free hand, in all of the Antarctic, and would consequently be in the national interests of the country. From the point of view of pure balance-of-power thinking or other conflict-oriented approaches, one would perhaps expect the American strategy to have issued in tactics of dominance or of 'divide and conquer'. The American policy seems in reality to be essentially more subtle and many-sided than this. On the one hand, there have been attempts on the American side to reduce the practical value of the territorial claims of the small states. Parallel with this, however, the USA has apparently also seen a strengthening of the capability of the small states as a positive factor in its own long-term political objectives. One instrument here has been generous offers of bilateral co-

operative projects with the small states. This has given mutual benefits; the USA has won the cooperation (somewhat hesitant and reluctant, to be sure) of the small states for its own long-term goals, and has won their good-will into the bargain; the small states, for their part, have been able to share in scientific results which, with their own limited resources, they would not otherwise have been able to obtain.

When US policy in the Antarctic toward the small states concerned has been able to meet with this measure of success, it must be seen in the context of the following factors:

(1) The practical advantages which the small states derive from cooperating in the Antarctic weigh heavily against the expected results of the possible assertion of their respective small-states interests through bloc-behavior. This raises a question which is wider in perspective: Would the need of small states for a possible cooperation between them, based purely on small-state interests, weaken if they integrated into a more comprehensive cooperative structure which included big powers? In other words: Would a 'maxi-cooperation' remove the presupposition of a possible 'mini-cooperation'?

(2) To a high degree, the choice of alternative actions on the part of the small states has had to be based on evaluations of their own options for action, singly or jointly, *vis-à-vis* those options which cooperation with the big powers can give them. The British Antarctic policy may be illustrating in this respect. Great Britain, which, in this context (especially in relation to the USA), must be considered a small state, has obvious nationalist objectives to protect in the Antarctic. At the same time, however, the evaluations, on the part of the British themselves, of how these objectives can be optimally advanced have led Great Britain to be highly flexible in her acceptance of projects pointing in the direction of internationalized rights of sovereignty.

(3) The small states in question here comprise a rather heterogeneous group with regard to geographic, historical, and cultural background. This may explain the absence of the development of any bloc-community: If a more homogeneous, 'national group' of states had been concerned, the preconditions for a community of interests, which could be protected through a small-states bloc, would presumably also have been present to a greater extent.

A conclusion such as the one noted above opens up interesting perspectives in a wider context, especially with regard to the Arctic. The hypothesis that mutual 'proximity' (geographically, culturally, etc.) between small states will be the decisive factor in whether bloc-behavior will occur or not, indicates that there are quite otherwise favorable conditions for this in the Arctic than in the Antarctic. In the Arctic, the Nordic countries seem to comprise precisely such a homogeneous group with a natural community of interests *vis-à-vis* the big powers (cf. separate paragraph on this, below).

All of the preceding analysis and argumentation is based, however, on the postulate that it is fruitful and realistic to operate with the dichotomy big-small in the study of international politics in general. The fact that such a point of departure may be somewhat dubious, however, is something which has also been suggested by another scholar in this field, J. J. Holst, in his remark:

Smallness is in and of itself an irrelevant basis on which to establish allegiances, coalitions and commitments in international relations.⁸

The small-states issue, which forms the frame of reference for the present discussion, presupposes the stipulation that there is a built-in opposition between big and small states, inherent in international society. In the study of international *con-flicts*, such an approach may seem reasonable, but what about those inter-state interactions which are *not* primarily conflict-oriented?

With regard to such a *cooperation-oriented problem-situation* as that we are dealing with in the 'Antarctic Model', it is not just given that the small states, *qua* small states, have common interests in some sort of opposition to the big ones. In the Antarctic it is seen how the 'imperialist' policy of the big powers - primarily that of the USA - is the very foundation of a fruitful symbiosis between big and small states. There are also indications that harmonious and fruitful cooperation will take place more easily between big and small states than it will between the small states themselves. This has to do with the considerable differences between big and small states with regard to *resources* and *capability*; this factor entails that cooperation between a big and a small state would give the small state advantages which it would not be able to obtain were it confined to cooperating with other small states whose resources were as scarce as its own. Here the factor of *competition* also comes into play: Cooperation between several small states could easily provoke contests as to 'who should be allowed to do what' with the limited resources, and would thereby tend to promote conflict. In small and big state cooperation, such rivalry will not arise, and the possibility of a rational division of labor to the advantage of both parties would be more likely to be present.

The views which have been developed in the above can be summed up in what initially, for the want of a better expression, and in the expectation of reaching a higher level of precision, we have called a 'big state/small state balance model'. It should be noted that the hypotheses expressed here share certain features in common with A. F. K. Organski's balance-and conflict-theory,⁹ a central point of which is precisely that equality promotes conflict, while pure big-power hegemony promotes harmony and balance in the international system. In Organski's model, then the oppositions do not necessarily obtain between the small and the big, but between those of equal strength.

With this in mind there may be reason to put a question mark at the common assumption that big-small conflict is always a relevant problem-situation in the study of international relations.

III. THE PARTICIPATION OF SMALL AND BIG STATES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARCTIC

If we compare the situation in the Arctic with that of the Antarctic, we will find points of resemblance as well as essential differences. Common to both regions is their increasing significance chiefly as regions for research, but also to an increasing extent from an economic point of view as potentially important parts of our planet. Both regions attract the attention of a smaller group of interested states — both big and small. In either region the climatic conditions make permanent settlement difficult, and pose special problems for all operations.

As far as differences are concerned, there are in the first place the purely security-political circumstances: While the *Antarctic* is a region of relatively slight sensitivity in a security-political respect, the *Arctic* is a security-political tension-field of the first order, *inter alia*, because of its location between the two super-powers.¹⁰ In the second place, as distinct from the Antarctic, all land and islands in the Arctic are subjected to uncontested national sovereignty, and so cannot, among other things, be considered among the 'new territories'. For practical reasons, as well as for purposes of analysis, it may be convenient to postulate a division of the Arctic into three types of region:¹¹

Zone I — The central Arctic Ocean.

Zone II — 'Borderline zones' of contested status, such as ocean zones where various states claim certain rights of regulation, and the like.

Zone III — Recognized national territories: Land, islands, national territorial waters, and continental shelves.

context have already been made the subject of systematic treatment by W. Østreng in a recent study.¹³ Østreng's work is primarily an examination and analysis of current needs for cooperation, and the options of the Scandinavian countries in the further exploration and exploitation of Arctic regions.

For the big state/small state issue these factors are of immediate interest. In the widest sense, we are faced with the general problem-situation national control/international cooperation. More concretely, with our starting-point in the general technological and economic development which has made the Arctic a potentially highly important region, but one where a number of legal and political problems remain unsolved, we are faced with the question of the need for, and desirability of, establishing small-states cooperation in a region where there are established big-power interests.

The Nordic countries will be directly affected by the development in the Arctic. For them, a question worth analysing must be whether they can better safeguard their interests through cooperation than individually, and whether or not they have mutual interests which would make cooperation between them natural and necessary. On the one hand, there are the concrete needs which may arise for cooperation of scientific, technological/economic, and political nature. On the other hand, there is the question of the option for each individual country to engage in this type of cooperation on the basis of their general foreign-policy orientation. (Here one must take into consideration the fact that, while the Nordic countries are quite homogeneous in a geographic, historical, and cultural sense, they are more heterogeneous with regard to alliance commitments). As a decisive factor in this context there is, however, the question of the need and possible options to seek *alternative* cooperation-partners and -patterns.

Four options seem open to the Nordic countries in the present situation.¹⁴

(1) They may meet the situation and its challenges singly and on their own, without cooperating with anyone.

(2) They may cooperate individually with the big powers.

(3) They may cooperate between themselves at a small-states level.

(4) They may cooperate between themselves in an expanded cooperation with the big powers.

The small countries that have interests in the Arctic, share in common the circumstance that individually they can, by and large, achieve what each of the other small countries can. What some have gained in terms of experience in activity in these regions, the others will be able to make up for by a relatively limited mobilization in terms of economy and personnel.

The chief purpose of any international cooperation — seen from the point of view of the respective national agents — must be to seek the furtherance of national interests. The type of cooperation in which one chooses to engage will therefore reflect a conception of the means that one wishes to utilize in the furtherance of these interests. On the background of such an evaluation, it may in this context also be of interest to evaluate whether the division into groups of big and small states tells us anything essential as to the form of cooperation in which the small states ought advantageously to engage in this region.

A possible Nordic cooperation at a small-states level in the Arctic *may* lead to a contest over who should be the first among equals. Even if the resources are pooled, one is not thereby guaranteed a satisfactory reward, whether in the form of scientific results, or in the form of economic benefits. It is conceivable that bilateral cooperation with a big power would better promote national interests. In such a cooperation the big state would not perceive the small one as a troublesome rival, but as a valuable partner. There would be no question of equal ef-

Furthermore, the ocean regions are distinctive, in so far as in the Arctic they have, and seem to be getting, quite a different significance for transport and communications than the Antarctic Ocean. To a not inconsiderable extent this is underscored by the optimism surrounding the possibility of finding oil on the continental shelf in the Arctic.¹²

Also, the small states which have interests in the Arctic are different from those which we find involved in the Antarctic. They are more homogeneous with regard to both geographic location, cultural and economic background, and political structure, than the states which are currently involved in cooperation in the Antarctic. Nor can it be said that there are any essential disagreements between them concerning their respective interests in the Arctic.

Common to both polar regions is the circumstance that technological and economic development has enabled the big powers, to a much larger extent than the small states, to defend old rights and assert new ones. The big powers can by themselves start a development which *must* affect the small states that hold interests in the regions. This is also the situation for the Nordic countries with regard to the Arctic. An essentially expanded activity in the Arctic on the part of the big powers cannot avoid affecting the interests which the Nordic countries, primarily Denmark and Norway, have traditionally held. The question is whether one should remain passive toward an increase in activity, or whether it might in some way be better to protect national interests by actively participating in the development.

Against the background that has been roughly sketched here, it might be of interest to evaluate whether the big state/small state considerations that were noted in the preceding, may also be relevant with regard to the Nordic countries, and to their participation in the development that is under way in the Arctic. A number of factors which are fundamental in this

forts. But in return for its participation in such cooperation, the small state could obtain considerable advantages which it could not otherwise obtain, either by itself or in cooperation with other small states. In such a situation the small-state role is a means to promoting national interests, something which is somewhat incongruous with the ordinary conception which stresses the disadvantages of being small in the international system. A policy such as the one suggested here, however, has its more doubtful aspects from the vantage points of the national interests of the small state. Here we should note in particular the risk a small state runs of being *dominated*, if it based itself exclusively on *bilateral* cooperation with one big power.

Considerations corresponding to those in the preceding paragraph can to some extent also be brought to bear on the evaluation of the fourth alternative course of action mentioned; cooperation between small states within an expanded cooperation with the big powers. Here, however, the question arises of how expedient it is to combine cooperation on different levels, cf. what is noted above concerning 'maxi-' v. 'mini-cooperation'. In this context an important factor is doubtless the *area* of possible cooperation. As regards the situation of the Nordic countries in the Arctic, it may seem convenient with cooperation at the small-states level ('mini-cooperation') in matters of purely *political* character (such as the harmonization of viewpoints, long-term objectives, and the like). In matters of a *practical*, 'operational' character, conditions would presumably favor some of the forms of 'maxi-cooperation' discussed earlier. In such a dualist cooperation pattern there is also a *safeguard*: For the small state, the betting on different cooperation combinations at several levels would be able to work as a form for 'risk spread', which in turn could work as a counterbalance against the threat of *dominion* which a purely bilateral big-small relation may entail.

As may be seen, an interaction-pattern between small and big states, such as has

been discussed above, has interesting points of resemblance with the cooperation picture which is found in the 'Antarctic Model' (see above). It is unrealistic today to regard the 'Antarctic Model' without qualifications applicable in the north; the two polar regions are too different, e.g. in security-political respects.¹⁵ From the vantage point of a small state, however, the pattern of cooperation prevalent in the Antarctic must also appear as the ideal one in the Arctic context.

IV. FINAL REMARKS

An attempt has been made in the preceding to bring to bear several considerations, of both a general and particular nature, over the position of small states in international politics. The objective has been twofold; on the one hand to discuss the *practical/political* possibilities and limitations inherent in the situation of the small states, and on the other hand to contribute toward an improved *theoretical* foundation for the study of small states.

Our central considerations, which have been tentatively named the 'big state/small state-balance model', have been developed from the point of view of a *polar-political* perspective. The empirical material is chiefly the development which has taken place in the Antarctic; in addition, the Arctic situation has been brought in as a supplement, and in order to give a comparative basis.

The relevant discussion and theorizing, however, is not tied to the purely polar-political point of departure. The basis for the considerations over big states/small states relations etc., is essentially to be found on two levels, which may be referred to by the cues:

- (1) The 'new-territories' issue.
- (2) The cooperation-issue.

Furthermore, on both of these levels we find inherent the dual tension-field between, on the one hand, different *national* interests, and on the other hand, between

national and *international* objectives and interests.

The special needs for cooperation, which will be present in 'new territories', will also affect the pattern one will find of options and limitations of conduct in states of different orders of magnitude. There seems, however, to be no reason to assume that the 'big state/small state-balance model' is relevant only with regard to the 'new territories'. The *cooperation-issue* remains as a crucial point: It will chiefly be the *types of need for cooperation* with which one is dealing that will decide the extent to which our considerations may be applicable.

NOTES

¹ With regard to this literature, special mention should be made of the following titles: Annette Baker Fox, *The Power of Small States*, Chicago 1959; David Vital, *The Inequality of States*, Oxford 1967; Robert L. Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers*, New York and London 1968; Anders C. Sjaastad, *Småstater i studiet av internasjonal politikk*, NUPI Reports R-3 and R-7 (Oslo), December 1970 and December 1971; Arne Olav Brundtland and August Schou (eds.), *Small States in International Relations*, Stockholm 1971; and Trygve Mathisen, *The Functions of Small States in the Strategies of the Great Powers*, Oslo 1971.

² Cf. Anders C. Sjaastad, *Småstater i studiet av internasjonal politikk - Referat fra en nordisk konferanse*, NUPI-Notat N-10, (Oslo) February 1971, and *Småstater i studiet av internasjonal politikk: Et diskusjonsinnlegg*, NUPI-Notat N-11 (Oslo) February 1971.

³ A more comprehensive coverage of this research is given through the various series of publications (esp. the AA:H and AA:P series) from the Fridtjof Nansen Foundation at Polhøgda.

⁴ Cf. Truls Hanevold, Gunnar Skagestad and Finn Sollie, 'Ekstrasjonale rikdommer - Hvem skal kontrollere havbunnen, Antarktis og verdensrommet?', in *FN etter 25 år?* The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo 1970, pp. 72-74.

⁵ Cf. Finn Sollie, *The New Development in the Polar Regions* (study AA:P110/2), The Fridtjof Nansen Foundation at Polhøgda, 1972, p. 10.

⁶ Cf. Gunnar Skagestad, 'Spørsmålet om regulering av ressursutnyttelse i 'nye territorier': Løsningsalternativer og muligheter', *Minerva's Kvantitativskrift*, Nos. 3/4, 1972, pp. 225-226.

⁷ A more comprehensive presentation of the Antarctic Treaty and of the developments which have taken place within the framework of this treaty is given by Truls Hanevold in his thesis *Suverenitet og samarbeid. Antarktis i samarbeidets tegn* (study AA:H008), The Fridtjof Nansen Foundation at Polhøgda, 1971.

⁸ Johan Jørgen Holst, *Small Countries in World Politics*, NUPI-Notat N-24 (Oslo) November 1971, p. 2.

⁹ A. F. K. Organski, *World Politics*, New York 1961.

¹⁰ Gunnar Skagestad, *Internasjonal samarbeid i polarområdene: Et sikkerhetspolitisk perspektiv* (study AA:P113), The Fridtjof Nansen Foundation at Polhøgda, May 1972, p. 3.

¹¹ Cf. the corresponding division of the Arctic into three zones, viz. the 'High Arctic', the 'Middle Arctic' and the 'National Arctic', as suggested by Finn Sollie in his article 'Forurensning av polområdene? Et spørsmål om regulering av utviklingen', *Internasjonal Politikk*, No. 1, January/March 1972, pp. 27-28.

¹² Cf. Kim Traavik and Willy Østreng, 'The Arctic and the Law of the Sea', in this volume. ¹³ Willy Østreng, *De skandinaviske land i Arktis. Forutsetninger og muligheter for samarbeid* (study AA:H007), The Fridtjof Nansen Foundation at Polhøgda, January 1973.

¹⁴ The listing is strictly schematic. Actually, the picture is more diversified and complicated, due, *inter alia*, to the 'middle power' Canada's position as a potential cooperation partner.

¹⁵ Cf. Gunnar Skagestad, *Samarbeidsformer: Aktuelle modeller for polarområdene* (study AA:P116), The Fridtjof Nansen Foundation at Polhøgda, May 1972, p. 9 and pp. 28-29.

Contents

Articles

WILLY ØSTRENG & GUNNAR SKAGESTAD:	The Challenge of New Territories - An Introduction	53
KIM TRAAVIK:	The Conquering of Inner Space. Resources and Conflicts on the Seabed	57
FINN SOLLIE:	The New Development in the Polar Regions	75
GUNNAR SKAGESTAD & KIM TRAAVIK:	New Problems. - Old Solutions	91
KIM TRAAVIK & WILLY ØSTRENG:	The Arctic Ocean and the Law of the Sea	105
HELGE VINDENES:	The UN Conference on the Law of the Sea - The Basic Problems from a Norwegian Point of View	121
TØNNE HUITFELDT:	A Strategic Perspective on the Arctic	135
FINN SOLLIE:	Norway's Continental Shelf and the Boundary Question on the Seabed	153
WILLY ØSTRENG:	Strength and Impotence. The Developing Countries and the Development in New Territories	167
PER ANTONSEN:	Natural Resources and Problems of Development	179
GUNNAR SKAGESTAD:	Small States in International Politics: A Polar-Political Perspective	185
FINN SOLLIE:	New Territories and New Problems in Norwegian Foreign Security Policy	195
	<i>Appendices</i>	203

UNIVERSITETSFORLAGET

OSLO — BERGEN — TROMSØ

E. Sem A.S., Halden

Cooperation and Conflict Nordic Journal of International Politics

Editorial Board

SVEN HENNINGSEN	University of Copenhagen
ERIK RESKE-NIELSEN	Danish School of Journalism, Århus
GÖRAN VON BONDORFF	University of Helsinki
JAN-MAGNUS JANSSON	University of Helsinki
JOHN SANNES	Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo
NILS ÖRVIK	University of Oslo
NILS ANDRÉN	University of Stockholm
KARL E. BIRNBAUM	Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm

Editor

JOHAN JÖRGEN HOLST Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo

Editorial Office

Cooperation and Conflict, Norsk utenrikspolitisk institutt, Postboks 8159, Oslo-Dep., Oslo 1, Norway

The views expressed in any articles in Cooperation and Conflict do not represent the opinions of the Editorial Board or the Editor. The authors alone are responsible for their contributions.

Prospective contributors are urged to read the Notes for Contributors set out on the back inside cover page.

Articles appearing in this journal are abstracted and indexed in ABC POL. SCI, Historical Abstracts and ULRICH's *International Periodicals Directory*.

All correspondence relating to subscriptions should be sent to:

Universitetsforlaget, P. O. Box 307, Blindern, Oslo 3, Norway or
Universitetsforlaget, P. O. Box 142, Boston, Mass. 02113, U.S.A.

Subscription rates

U. S. \$ 6.75 (or the equivalent in other currency) a year. Single copies \$ 2.00. For subscribers in the Nordic countries: N. kr. 49,— a year, Single copies N. kr. 12,—.
In the Nordic countries subscriptions may be obtained most easily through payment sent to one of the following postal accounts of Universitetsforlaget: Denmark: 14954, Norway: 155 30, Sweden: 4337 or in Finland to: Akademiska bokhandeln, Keskuskatu 2, Helsinki 10. Outside the Nordic countries payment by bank cheque should preferably be enclosed with subscription orders.